A note on the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism when strategies of agents are costly actions by Wu, Haoyang
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A note on the definition of Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of a mechanism when
strategies of agents are costly actions
Haoyang Wu
15 April 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/93325/
MPRA Paper No. 93325, posted 18 April 2019 08:20 UTC
A note on the denition of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of a mechanism when strategies of
agents are costly actions
Haoyang Wu 
Wan-Dou-Miao Research Lab, Room 301, Building 3, 718 WuYi Road,
200051, Shanghai, China.
Abstract
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social
choice function which species her favorite outcome for each possible prole of a-
gents' types. To do so, the designer constructs a mechanism which describes each
agent's feasible strategy set and the outcome function. Generally speaking, each
agent's strategy has two possible formats: an action, or a message. In this paper, we
focus on the former case and claim that the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of a mechanism should be based on a three-parameter prot function instead of
the conventional two-parameter utility function when strategies of agents are cost-
ly actions. Next, we derive the main result: Given a social choice function which
can be implemented by an indirect mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if all
strategies of agents are costly actions, then it cannot be inferred that there exist-
s a direct mechanism that can truthfully implement the social choice function in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Key words: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Mechanism design; Revelation Principle.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1{4], there are one designer
and some agents. 1 The designer would like to implement a desired social
choice function which species her favorite outcome for each possible prole
of agents' types. However, each agent's type is modelled as his private property
 Corresponding author.
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1 The designer is denoted as \She", and the agent is denoted as \He".
and unknown to the designer. In order to implement a social choice function
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the designer constructs a mechanism which
species each agent's strategy set (i:e:, the allowed actions of each agent) and
an outcome function (i:e:, a rule for how agents' actions get turned into a
social choice).
Generally speaking, each agent's strategy has two possible formats: an action,
or a message (i.e., a plan of action) (see MWG's Book, Page 883, Line 8, [1]).
The distinction between the two formats is that: the former format of strategy
is a real action which naturally requires some action cost to be performed
realistically, whereas the latter format of strategy is a message of action plan
which is reported by each agent to the designer and hence doesn't need action
cost to be performed realistically. In this paper, we focus on the former format
of strategy, and investigate what would happen to the notion of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of a mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce a notion of prot func-
tion (i.e., Denition 1), and then claim that the notion of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of a mechanism should be based on a three-parameter prot func-
tion instead of a two-parameter utility function when strategies of agents are
costly actions (i.e., Denition 2). Next, we derive the main result (i.e., Propo-
sition 1): Given a social choice function f which is implemented by an indirect
mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if all strategies of agents are costly
actions, then it cannot be inferred that there exists a direct mechanism that
can truthfully implement f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We consider two
possible arguments and give replies. Section 3 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Analysis
Consider a setting with one designer and I agents indexed by i = 1;    ; I.
Each agent i privately observes his type i that determines his preference
over elements in an outcome set X. The set of possible types for agent i is
denoted as i. The vector of agents' types  = (1;    ; I) is drawn from set
 = (1;    ;I) according to probability density (), and each agent i's
utility function over the outcome x 2 X given his type i is ui(x; i).
A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection of I strategy sets S1;    ; SI
and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X. The mechanism combined
with possible types (1;    ;I), the probability density () over the possible
realizations of  2 1      I , and utility functions (u1;    ; uI) denes
a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The strategy function of each
agent i in the game induced by   is a private function si() : i ! Si. Each
strategy set Si contains agent i's possible strategies (i:e:, actions, or plans of
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action). The outcome function g() describes the rule for how agents' strategies
get turned into a social choice. A social choice function (SCF) is a function
f : 1      I ! X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types
1;    ; I , assigns a collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Note 1: As shown above, for each agent i with type i, there are two possible
formats of his strategy si(i): an action, or a message.
Case 1 : If the format of strategy si(i) is an action, then si(i) should be
performed by agent i realistically. Hence, it is reasonable to say that in order
to perform si(i), agent i with type i shall spend some action cost (or make
some eort which can be quantied as some action cost).
Case 2 : If the format of strategy si(i) is a message, then si(i) is not a real
action and hence doesn't need action cost to be performed realistically. 2
In the following discussions, we will focus on the former case and investigate
what would happen to the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mecha-
nism. To simplify representations, we assume that each agent's action cost is
only relevant to his action and private type, and is independent of the game
outcome.
Denition 1: For a given social choice function f , consider a mechanism
  = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. If each
agent i's strategy si(i) : i ! Si in the game induced by   is a costly action,
then the corresponding action cost is dened by a cost function ci(si; i) :
Si  i ! R+, i.e., ci(si; i) > 0 for each si 2 Si, i 2 i. Suppose the
outcome yielded by   is x 2 X and agent i's utility is denoted by a two-
parameter function ui(x; i) : X  i ! R, then each agent i's prot is
dened by a three-parameter prot function pi(x; si; i) : X  Si i !R,
pi(x; si; i) = ui(x; i)  ci(si; i): (1)
Question 1: Someone may argue that when each agent performs a costly
strategy action, then the meaning of his utility has already changed, and has
included the action cost. Thus, it is not necessary to introduce another notion
of prot function to make confusion.
Answer 1: Generally speaking, there are two versions of utility function which
are usually used in the literature of game theory and mechanism design:
1) Three-parameter version: For example, in Section 13.C (Page 450, the
fourth line from the bottom, [1]), Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green use a three-
parameter function u(w; ej) = w   c(e; ) to denote the utility of a type 
agent who plays a strategy (i.e., choosing education level e) and receives an
outcome (i.e., the wage w), where c(e; ) denotes the agent's cost of obtaining
education level e. Obviously, the three-parameter utility function of agent i
does already include his strategy cost, and indeed is agent i's prot function.
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2) Two-parameter version: For example, in Section 23.B (Page 858, the fth
line from the bottom, [1]), Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green use a two-parameter
function ui(x; i) to denote the utility of agent i with type i after obtaining
an outcome x 2 X. Obviously, the two-parameter utility function does not
include any item to represent the action cost which may be spent by agent i
to obtain the outcome x. When agent i's strategy si is a costly action, i.e.,
ci(si; i) > 0, we must replace the two-parameter utility function ui(x; i) by
the three-parameter prot function pi(x; si; i) to exactly describe how much
each agent i benets from the game induced by a mechanism. 2
According to MWG's book [1], a strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i
and all i 2 i, s^i 2 Si,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]: (2)
Note 2: As given above, the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mech-
anism in the literature is always based on a two-parameter utility function
ui(x; i) : X  i ! R. The parameters s^i; si ; s i appeared in inequality (2)
are used by the designer to compute the outcome g() 2 X, and does not act
as parameters of agent i's utility function ui(x; i). Suppose that in an indi-
rect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), the format of each agent i's strategy
si(i) is an action that requires some cost to be performed, i:e:, ci(si; i) > 0.
Then, as pointed out in Answer 1, the two-parameter utility function ui(x; i)
neglects agent i's cost and cannot describe his net prot. Since it is the prot
that each rational agent really concerns in a game, the prot function should
be introduced to dene the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism. 2
Denition 2: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [pi(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); s

i (i); i)ji]  E i [pi(g(s^i; s i( i)); s^i; i)ji]
(3)
i:e:,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si, in which pi is the prot of agent i given by Eq (1).
2 In many practical cases, each agent's strategy is a costly action. Only in very
limited cases (e:g:, the strategy can be considered as an oral announcement) can
strategies be viewed as costless actions, and hence by Eq (1) the two-parameter
utility function can be viewed as be equivalent to the three-parameter prot func-
tion. Therefore, the conventional denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium based on
a two-parameter utility function holds only in these limited cases.
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According to MWG book [1], the mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) imple-
ments the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) =
f() for all  2 . A direct mechanism is a mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g())
in which Si = i for all i and g() = f() for all  2 1  I . 3 The social
choice function f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(or Bayesian incentive compatible) if si (i) = i for all i 2 i and i = 1;    ; I
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI ; g()),
in which Si = i, g = f . That is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i, ^i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]: (4)
Note 3: In the direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g()), each agent i indepen-
dently chooses his report strategy si() : i ! i, and the report type si(i)
does not need to be his true type i. Hence, the format of each agent i's strat-
egy is a message, and it is reasonable to assume each agent i plays his strategy
costlessly. 4 Thus, each agent's utility in the direct mechanism is just equal to
his prot. Obviously, although the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a
mechanism should be revised to Denition 2 when each agent's strategy is a
costly action, the conventional notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility still
holds as inequality (4) species.
Note 4: In a direct mechanism, the only thing that the designer gets from
each agent i is the reported type si 2 i. After the designer receives s1;    ; sI
from agents, she has no way to verify whether these reports are truthful or not.
All that the designer can do is just to announce f(s1;    ; sI) as the outcome.
Thus, in a direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g()), each agent i with type
i does not need to perform any strategy si(i) 2 Si specied in any indirect
mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), and consequently does not need to spend
any strategy cost ci(si; i).
5
3 Here we use a bar symbol to distinguish a direct mechanism from an indirect
mechanism.
4 Some researchers investigated misreporting costs in a direct mechanism [5,6],
which are possibly spent by agents when reporting a false type. It should be noted
that the misreporting cost is irrelevant to this paper. Our result holds no mat-
ter whether there exists the misreporting cost or not. Hence, we simply omit the
misreporting cost in this paper.
5 Someone may argue that in a direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g()), in addition
to choose a type si 2 i to report, each agent may also be willing to perform an
additional strategy si(i) 2 Si as what he would perform in some indirect mechanism
  = (S1;    ; SI ; g()). Thus, each agent i with type i also spends strategy cost
ci(si; i) in the indirect mechanism. However, this argument requires each agent to
do beyond the framework of the direct mechanism, since strategy si(i) 2 Si is
meaningless and not dened in the direct mechanism   = ( S1;    ; SI , g()).
5
Proposition 1: For a given social choice function f , suppose that there exists
an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that implements it in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. If each agent's strategy si 2 Si is a costly action, i:e:,
ci(si; i) > 0, then it cannot be inferred that there exists a direct mechanism
that can truthfully implement f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the social choice function f , and the indirect mechanism   =
(S1;    ; SI ; g()) that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there
exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that the mapping
g(s()) : 1  I ! X from a vector of agents' types  = (1;    ; I) into
an outcome g(s()) is equal to the desired outcome f(), i:e:, g(s()) = f()
for all  2 1     I .
By Denition 2, for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s^i; s

 i( i)); i)  ci(s^i; i))ji]
for all s^i 2 Si. Thus, for all i and all i 2 i, ^i 2 i,
E i [(ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (i); i))ji] 
E i [(ui(g(s

i (^i); s

 i( i)); i)  ci(si (^i); i))ji]:
Since g(s()) = f() for all , then for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [(ui(f(i;  i); i) ci(si (i); i))ji]  E i [(ui(f(^i;  i); i) ci(si (^i); i))ji];
for all ^i 2 i. Note that the above inequality cannot infer the inequality (4).
Consequently, it cannot be inferred that there exists a direct mechanism that
can truthfully implement f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
Question 2: Someone may disagree with Note 4 and Proposition 1, and pro-
pose a \direct revelation game" as follows. For a given social choice function
f , suppose there is an indirect mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that im-
plements f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium strategy is
s = (s1;    ; sI). Consider this equilibrium, there is a mapping from vectors
of agents' types into outcomes. Now we take the mapping to be a revelation
game, i:e:, each agent i with private type i independently chooses a type
^i 2 i to report to the designer, and the designer suggests each agent an
action si (^i) 2 Si. Then no type of any agent can benet by reporting a false
type ^i 6= i and performing the suggested action si (^i). As a result, truth-
telling is the equilibrium strategy of this game, i.e., each agent i reports his
true type i and performs the strategy action s

i (i), the same as what he
would perform in the indirect mechanism  .
6
Answer 2: It should be noted that in the direct revelation game, each agent
i with private type i can choose an arbitrary type ^i 2 i to report to the
designer, which means that the corresponding si (^i) 2 Si is not always equal to
si (i). Thus, after the designer receives an arbitrary report prole (^1;    ; ^I),
in order to exactly know which si (^i) should be suggested to each agent, the
designer must know not only the specic si (i), but also each agent i's strategy
function si () : i ! Si. However, the designer is always at the information
disadvantage in a mechanism: she does not know each agent i's private type
i, nor his private strategy function s

i () : i ! Si. 6 Therefore, the so-called
direct revelation game does not hold. 2
3 Conclusion
This paper mainly investigates the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a
mechanism when the format of each agent's strategy is an action. The work
is also relevant to the possible failure of revelation principle. So far, there
have been several discussions on possible failures of the revelation principle:
Kephart and Conitzer [6] proposed that when reporting truthfully is costless
and misreporting is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold. Bester
and Strausz [7] pointed out that the revelation principle may fail because of
imperfect commitment. Martimort and Stole [8] said that the revelation prin-
ciple does not apply to situations where several mechanism designers compete
against each other.
The main result of this paper is that: When strategies of agents are costly
actions, the denition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism should
be based on a three-parameter prot function rather than the conventional
two-parameter utility function (see Denition 2). This is the key point why
the revelation principle may fail, and this failure is dierent from the current
discussions of possible failures of the revelation principle.
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6 Otherwise, assume to the contrary that the designer knows each agent i's strategy
function si () : i ! Si, then she can easily infer each agent i's private type i from
his report si (i). This case contradicts the basic framework of mechanism design
and does not hold.
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